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Abstract
This paper argues that graduated penalties observed in most legal systems may
be an attempt to direct law enforcement e￿orts towards crimes that are socially more
harmful, thereby achieving better deterrence overall. The critical assumptions are:
the state cannot commit to a monitoring strategy, and has mixed motives (objectives
other than deterrence). However, graduated penalties arise only in the presence of
secondary motives that value punishment in itself, such as retribution or ￿nes collected
from violators. Other motives that are unrelated to the size of punishment, such as
prevention of criminal attempts, will also lead to distortions, but those cannot be
corrected by restructuring penalties. The overall harshness of a criminal justice system
and the retributive instincts of its designers may be related in counter intuitive ways,
and law enforcement may be improved through strategic delegation.
JEL Classi￿cation No.: C7, K4.
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Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru University and the Canadian Theory Meetings for helpful comments. All remaining
errors are my own.1 Introduction
In a well known paper, Becker (1968) made the point that e￿cient law enforcement policies
should set ￿nes at the highest feasible level. Fines and policing are substitutes for the
purpose of deterrence, but only policing is costly in terms of resources. Therefore, it is
optimal to rely on the costless instrument|￿nes|to the extent possible.
Legal systems in most societies, however, specify penalties that increase with the social
harm caused by the proscribed activity. Murder carries considerably greater sanction than
parking violations. This paper outlines one reason why penalties may be dovetailed to the
magnitude of the crime. The argument rests on a couple of features that have received
very little attention in the literature on optimal deterrence, but which, I will argue, are
critical aspects of legal design and enforcement in the real world. First, legislation and
policing strategies are often shaped by mixed motives|in addition to deterrence, other
imperatives like redress, retribution and prevention of criminal attempts play a signi￿cant
role. Second, it is unreasonable to assume that the state can commit beforehand to all
relevant parameters of a legal system. While penalties are typically not subject to arbitrary
revision in a system governed by the rule of law, decisions to allocate costly resources to the
pursuit and prosecution of various criminal activities are more discretionary and responsive
to changing behavior patterns. I capture this by introducing partial commitment in the
standard deterrence model|the choice of penalties at the legislative stage is subject to
commitment (in the Stackelberg sense), but monitoring strategies in the enforcement stage
must be co-determined with citizens’ choices over legal and illegal actions (in the Cournot
sense). This paper shows that mixed motives and partial commitment have some interesting
implications regarding the optimal structure of penalties in a simple general equilibrium
model of crime and punishment. In particular, they can give rise to the kind of graduated
penalties commonly observed, but that conclusion rests on the exact mix of underlying
motives considered.
Ex ante, society would like to concentrate scarce law enforcement resources on highly
harmful activities, so as to discourage people from undertaking them. Ex post, however, it
is optimal to adopt a policing strategy that maximizes other things|e.g., the collection of
￿nes to reduce the damage caused by various crimes (redress), the pain and loss imposed on
1criminals (retribution), the number of criminal attempts successfully stopped (prevention),
or some combination thereof. While the deterrence motive demands the concentration of
resources on crimes that are rare (as would be the case if serious crimes were successfully
deterred), the redress, retribution or prevention motives provide a temptation to shift them
to crimes that are common. This creates a time inconsistency problem which would tend to
erode optimal deterrence, unless law enforcement had some way of committing to a policy
that wasn’t ex post optimal. In the framework considered in this paper, the presence of
a full ￿edged commitment mechanism implies that optimal ￿nes for all kinds of crime are
maximal, i.e., the benchmark in our analysis will remove the known factors that can give
rise to graduated penalties. However, if commitment is only partial, I show that lawmakers
may want to reduce the penalty on petty crimes as a credible way of announcing their intent
to pursue serious crimes more vigorously.
The time inconsistency and the consequent departure from the ￿rst best (full commit-
ment) solution arises for all di￿erent motives that may be assumed to work in conjunction
with deterrence|redress, retribution or prevention. Moreover, the penalty structure chosen
a￿ects outcomes in a non-trivial manner in every case. However, the second best (partial
commitment) solution requires a moderation of some punishments only if the secondary mo-
tive is redress or retribution, but not prevention. Put another way, if a society derives some
direct bene￿t from the punishments handed out, it may want to choose lower punishments
for many crimes, usually the less harmful ones (punishment ￿ts the crime). On the other
hand, a society which has a neutral attitude towards the instrument, i.e., neither values nor
su￿ers a cost on account of the punishments per se, will want to punish all crimes to the
maximum possible extent (Taliban justice). A taste for punishment makes one punish less!
The key to this counter-intuitive result lies in the observation that when the state values
punishment for its own sake, the selective reduction of penalties will alter the incentives of
not only criminals but also the law and order machinery itself.1 If the state su￿ers from
a commitment problem in the ￿rst place, denying itself some rewards a￿ords a way of ex-
1Since all choices are inter-dependent in a strategic context, altering the penalty structure will change
the state’s monitoring choices even when penalties do not directly enter its payo￿ function. The important
distinction is that in the presence of a ‘taste for punishment’, choice of penalties shifts the state’s reaction
function in the monitoring and enforcement stage, and not merely equilibrium choices.
2ercising strategic self manipulation (a phenomenon which also arises in models of strategic
delegation, e.g., Fershtman and Judd(1987)) that can be exploited to its advantage.
The idea that excessively harsh penalties on relatively innocuous crimes can cause a
misallocation of police resources is sometimes voiced in the popular press and in legislative
debates. For example, an editorial in the Washington Times dated October 10, 2003 criti-
cized a crackdown on drunk driving conducted by the Washington D.C police department
as a distraction from more serious concerns like terrorism and violent crime. An opinion
piece in The Hawaii Reporter on June 12, 2003 (Rowland (2003)) criticized a local seat belt
enforcement drive for the same reason, going further to identify the negative incentive e￿ects
of ￿awed legislation as the principal cause:
[I]t was never clear what was really accomplished except for extracting $277,046
by force of law and roadblocks at 124 locations, and that compliance with the law
was \up"... The seat belt compliance program is a great example of misallocation
of resources by misplaced incentives fashioned by legislators at all levels. In other
words, the police made money on the deal, so they did it [italics mine].
These same concerns were echoed by Minnesota State Representative Phyllis Kahn (see
Kahn (2001)), while introducing a bill to legalize ticket scalping|at the time a misdemeanor
in Minneapolis punishable by 90 days in prison, a $700 ￿ne or both. In defending the bill,
she stated
At a time [the eve of a major basketball game] when there are thousands of people
visiting the Twin Cities, we should be making them feel as safe and welcome as
possible. Police resources should be used to enforce pedestrian right-of-way or
to make sure our guests aren’t getting stuck in tra￿c or getting their pockets
picked. Assigning so many o￿cers to a crack-down on ticket scalping is a waste
of valuable police time, and I hope this legislation will be a ￿rst step in curbing
that misallocation of public resources.
Criticism of the \war on drugs" or \tough on crime" legislation sometimes focuses on
ine￿ciency and waste, as opposed to libertarian or compassionate arguments. At the same
3time, advocates of harsh penal codes often cite their deterrence bene￿ts rather than moral
￿tness. Our analysis suggests that both sides may have a point, depending on the exact
motives that shape the behavior of law enforcement.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature. In
section 3, I lay out a general model which nests all possible motives discussed in the paper.
Sections 4 and 5 analyze special cases where either a redress-retribution motive is present
or a prevention motive, in conjunction with deterrence. The results are then compared.
Section 6 solves an example where the distribution of bene￿ts are uniform, and illustrates
some additional interesting possibilities. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The application of rational choice models to legislation and illegal activity, which started with
Becker (1968), has, with a few exceptions, remained focused on cost bene￿t analysis with
deterrence as the sole objective. Nevertheless, there is a thriving debate among philosophers
and legal theorists regarding the justi￿cation of imposing su￿ering on o￿enders, both from
a normative and a descriptive viewpoint. A fairly standard distinction often drawn is that
between backward looking or retributivist justi￿cations|those based on evaluation of an
act already committed|and forward looking or consequentialist rationales|those based on
evaluation of acts that could be committed in the future. Many writers have expressed
the view that a proper account of existing criminal justice systems or our intuitions about
how they should be designed is impossible without combining elements from both strands
of thought (Hart (1958)).2 In a more empirical vein, response of experimental subjects to
questionnaires about crime and punishment often reveal a strong retributive motive but
a weak deterrence motive (Sunstein, Schkade and Kahneman (2000)). Analyzing actual
sentencing data, Glaesar and Sacerdote (2000) ￿nd that random victim characteristics have
a signi￿cant e￿ect on sentencing decisions for crimes like vehicular manslaughter, suggesting
the presence of moral and emotional factors apart from deterrence. These observations
2See the entry under \Punishment" in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a brief overview of
the main themes and arguments. As quoted there, Nietzche supposedly made the remark that the discourse
supporting various legal systems is \overdetermined by utilities of every sort."
4suggest that the economic theory of crime and law enforcement could be enriched by going
beyond deterrence and incorporating a multiplicity of objectives.
In economic models that deal with random monitoring, including the crime literature,
the typical assumption is that the choice of probability is committed to beforehand, e.g., by
specifying it in a binding contract. Some papers depart from this trend and model monitoring
choices to be an outcome of equilibrium in some game rather than a commitment. Examples
include Khalil (1997) in the context of a procurement problem, Graetz, Reinganum and
Wilde (1986) in a model of tax auditing, and Tsebelis (1989) on law enforcement. The last
paper is the one thematically closest to this, but it lacks several other modeling features
analyzed here, such as multiple crimes or mixed motives, and the paper’s conclusion that
raising penalties will leave the crime rate unchanged is an artifact of the simple 2 ￿ 2 game
considered. As for empirical evidence regarding the impact of monitoring on crime, Di Tella
and Schardgorsky (2004) and Levitt (1997) among others ￿nd a signi￿cant deterrent e￿ect
of police presence for many illegal activities.
A number of papers have derived graduated penalties in deterrence based models as-
suming commitment to a monitoring policy. There are two major factors identi￿ed in this
literature as the reason for gradualism. One is the presence of general, as opposed to speci￿c,
monitoring|situations where di￿erent crimes must be monitored at a common rate since
they cannot be targeted separately (Shavell (1991)). Another is marginal deterrence (Stigler
(1970), Shavell (1992), Wilde (1992), Mookherjee and Png (1994)). Marginal deterrence is
achieved if criminals can be induced to switch from more harmful to less harmful activities.
When penalties are uniformly high, some people may be deterred from any crime whatso-
ever, but those who choose to break the law will tend to gravitate towards the most serious
o￿enses. This paper considers scenarios which are the mirror image of general monitoring
and marginal deterrence models. Instead of allowing criminals to switch between crimes
while con￿ning law enforcement to a common monitoring strategy, I assume enforcement
resources to be mobile across crimes but not criminals’ e￿orts. These are complementary
appoaches that address plausible but distinct scenarios. For example, people may easily
switch from exceeding the speed limit by 5 mph to 20 mph or from concealing a small part
of their income to all of it, but it is hard to imagine jaywalkers becoming bank robbers
because the di￿erence in penalties is insu￿cient.
5Another suggested reason for making the punishment ￿t the crime is jury aversion to
the possibility of conviction errors (Andreoni (1991)), which makes conviction less likely
when the penalty is increased and may have a negative e￿ect on deterrence. Some papers
show that maximal ￿nes need not be optimal in speci￿c situations, but do not demonstrate
that there should be a positive relationship between damage and punishment. Suggested
factors include risk aversion (Polinsky and Shavell (1979)), wealth constraints (Polinsky and
Shavell (1991)), heterogeneity in apprehension probability (Bebchuk and Kaplow (1993)),
corruption among law enforcers (Becker and Stigler (1974), Bowles and Garoupa (1997)) and
criminals’ costly investment in avoidance (Malik(1990)). For more comprehensive discussions
on the literature on optimal penalties, see the surveys by Ehrlich (1996), Garoupa (1997)
and Polinsky and Shavell (2000).
Finally, Persico (2002) uses a very similar two sector model to address the question
whether racial pro￿ling promotes deterrence at the cost of fairness. However, in his model,
￿nes are exogenous and while the sectors di￿er in the distribution of bene￿ts from com-
mitting a crime, the social damage is symmetric (since Persico’s concern is pro￿ling, his
model essentially evaluates di￿erent monitoring strategies for two observationally distinct
sub-populations who can commit the same crime but possibly at di￿erent rates). Persico
also assumes that police aim to \maximize arrests", which is compatible with all the dif-
ferent motivations considered here (retribution or redress versus prevention) because of the
symmetry of his case, and hence cannot distinguish between the e￿ects of these factors in a
more general setting involving multiple crimes.
3 A General Model
There are two kinds of illegal activity, labeled 1 and 2. Corresponding to each, there is a
population of potential o￿enders of measure one, who choose whether or not to commit the
o￿ense. The decision to commit each type of crime is an independent act, i.e., we disallow
at the outset the kind of substitution possibilities between crimes that raise the issue of
marginal deterrence.
The private bene￿t bi of commiting crime i is a random variable with distribution Fi(bi) in
6the population. This bene￿t accrues conditional on the crime being successfully completed;
in case the attempt is thwarted, the bene￿t is 0. Below, I discuss how the monitoring of an
activity by law enforcement a￿ects the success rate of criminal attempts. We assume that
Fi(:) is continuously di￿erentiable over its domain.
The social harm from criminal act i is ci. Without loss of generality, I will assume
c1 > c2, i.e., activity 1 is the more serious crime from a social viewpoint. The police
choose how frequently to monitor the populaion for each type of infraction, which in turn
a￿ects the crime speci￿c rate of conviction of criminals. Let pi denote the probability that
a random person who has committed the type i crime will be apprehended by the police.
This number depends on the resources allocated towards ￿ghting the crime in question, and
is hence a choice variable for law enforcement. In the parlance of the law and economics
literature, monitoring is assumed to be speci￿c rather than general. However, the total
monitoring resources is ￿xed, and only its allocation across di￿erent crimes is subject to
choice. Mathematically, we impose the constraint that the average conviction rate must be
some given number p, i.e.,3
1
2
(p1 + p2) = p (1)
Lawmakers also choose penalties s1 and s2 for the two crimes, but cannot impose penalties
exceeding some value S, which captures wealth or moral constraints on punishment. These
penalties are best interpreted as ￿nes, but can also be treated as prison sentences, if impris-
oning o￿enders does not impose a net cost on society (which would be true, for example, if
the incapacitation bene￿ts exceed the cost of running prisons).
In formulating the complementary problems of legislation and law enforcement, I will
allow a number of di￿erent motives to in￿uence the choices of legislators and police. I
assume no fundamental con￿ict of objectives between lawmakers and law enforcers, who
3Two generalizations can easily be accommodated without any qualitative modi￿cation to the results.
First, p can be endogenized by assuming a convex cost function for total law enforcement resources, and
allowing it to be chosen in the ￿rst stage. For any given p, its allocation across crimes will be subject to
exactly the analysis done here. Second, the assumption that the two kinds of monitoring activity are perfect
substitutes can easily be relaxed by assuming some downward sloping and possibly non-linear frontier of the
form ’(p1;p2) = 0 from which (p1;p2) must be chosen. Similar results will be obtained if ’ allows su￿cient
but not perfect substitutability.
7will jointly be referred to as \authorities"4. First, there is the standard deterrence motive|
the authorities want less people to commit each crime than more. Second there may be
a redress or retributive motive|every dollar collected in ￿nes from apprehended criminals
(or every year of imprisonment, if penalties are interpreted as prison terms) contributes to
social welfare by an amount ￿. One way to think about this is to view the revenue collected
from criminals as a \sin tax" which ￿nances public goods (including law enforcement itself)
or compensates victims without the need for distortionary taxation on productive activity
(redress). If the penalty is a prison term, ￿ may be thought of as bene￿ts from incapacitation.
Alternatively, it could be an ethical utility derived from imposing a burden on those who
have committed harmful acts against society (retribution)5. Finally, suppose that out of
all individuals trying to commit act i and apprehended by the police, a fraction ￿i are
stopped before they can complete their crime (or, if they have already committed the act,
the police can undo the damage). For example, a police patrol may stop a bank robbery
in progress through timely response, or recover part or whole of the loot through follow-up
investigation. The last factor constitutes what may be called a preventive motive. Note the
distinction from the deterrence motive, which arises from the desire to discourage people
from committing crimes in the ￿rst place, while prevention refers to stopping people who
have decided to commit them nevertheless.
I will assume the authorities are utilitarian, i.e., they attempt to minimize the sum
4However, due to the presence of mixed motives and the natural sequencing of legislation and enforcement,
the authorities su￿er from a time inconsistency problem, the nature of which will become clearer in the course
of the analysis.
5The purely retributive interpretation may be problematic, given the assumed linearity of the utility
from punishment. The authorities may derive greater ethical satisfaction from punishing those who have
committed more harmful acts, in which case ￿ will be crime speci￿c. Further, one imagines there will be
diminishing marginal utility from punishing, and the function may even become downward sloping (pun-
ishment becomes costly) after a peak is reached at some level of penalty. The notion of an ex post optimal
punishment or \just desert" has been much discussed in the law and philosophy literature, and there is
some evidence that most people form their punitive opinions guided by such a notion (Sunstein, Schkade
and Kahneman (2000)). Note, however, that since my main results are that optimal punishments may not
be maximal and may be designed to ￿t the crime, assuming a discriminatory taste for punishment (and
distaste beyond a point) should reinforce the results. Nevertheless, exploring more realistic speci￿cations of
preferences seems like a promising avenue for future research.





￿i [(1 ￿ pi￿i)ci ￿ ￿pisi] (2)
where ￿i is the measure of people who choose to commit crime i.
3.1 Equilibrium with Full Commitment
First, let us outline the full commitment case. This arises when the authorities can announce
(and commit to) all aspects of law and policing, i.e., the entire policy vector (s1;s2;p1;p2).
People in the population take this as given and choose whether to commit a crime or not,
based on their individual expected bene￿ts and expected costs. The marginal individual
is one for whom the expected bene￿t equals the expected cost, and who is consequently
indi￿erent between committing the crime and being a law abiding citizen. Note that because
of the possible prevention factor, the expected bene￿t is only (1 ￿ pi￿i)b, while the expeced
cost is pisi. For an arbitrary policy vector, the measure of people who commit a crime of type





. We make the following assumptions on the distributions
and parameters, which will be maintained throughout:





< 1 for i = 1;2.
Assumption NE: (No extortion) ci >
2￿pS
1￿2p￿i for i = 1;2.
Assumption I ensures that neither crime can be completely deterred. Even if all resources
were concentrated on any one activity and maximal penalties imposed on it, there will always
be some measure of people who will ￿nd it worthwhile to engage in it. Clearly, some kind
of limited resource assumption has to be made to generate trade-o￿s and make the problem
6Unlike much of the deterrence literature, I do not include the private bene￿ts of criminals in the cal-
culation of social welfare. The results do not depend on this as long as the activities are clearly socially
harmful, i.e., the social cost of the activities outweigh the criminals’ private gain in all situations. At any
rate, while the cost bene￿t approach is useful especially in those problems where the scope of legally per-
missible actions is itself an issue (e.g., determining speed limits or pollution quotas), its relevance to actions
that are universally deemed immoral is questionable. Most people will ￿nd it rather odd if one insists that
social policy towards rapists should take into account their enjoyment of rape.
9interesting. I make a slightly stronger assumption than is necessary to get the general ￿avor
of the results. This is done in order to avoid the inconvenience of corners (in terms of
deterrence).
Assumption NE guarantees that even if all resources were concentrated on one crime,
its net harm will remain positive. This ensures that deterrence remains the motive, as
opposed to extortion. The analysis may be quite di￿erent if the latter is the case, but it
is not the kind of issue this paper aims to address. Note that meeting these requirements
is not a problem|Assumption I can be satis￿ed by \stretching" out the distributions, and
Assumption NE simply requires the harms to be high enough.
Denote by asterisks (*) the magnitudes of a full commitment equilibrium. These are the
values of the instruments that minimize net social damage given by (2), after incorporating
appropriate expressions for ￿i to re￿ect citizens’ responses to the choice of these instruments.











[(1 ￿ pi￿i)ci ￿ ￿pisi] (3)
subject to si ￿ S, pi ￿ 0 and (1).
We postpone discussion of the salient properties of this equilibrium till the next section.
Before proceeding any further, we discuss an alternative scenario where the authorities can
only commit to the penalties for various crimes, but not the resources allocated towards
pursuing them.
3.2 Equilibrium with Partial Commitment
The assumption that the authorities can publicly commit to all law enforcement parameters
seems unrealistic. Since the penalties imposed on the guilty must be supported by law,
these do involve a good deal of prior commitment, especially if laws allow little room for
discretion in sentencing. How the police department allocates its time and e￿ort is a day
to day response to situations on the ground, and typically cannot be legislated. To address
this more plausible scenario, we consider a partial commitment case, where the authorities
￿rst choose s1 and s2, and then play a simultaneous move game with the citizens in which
p1, p2 and the decisions whether to commit each type of crime are taken simultaneously.
10In any interior equilibrium of the subgame, where both types of crime are monitored
to some degree, the expected marginal returns from targeting police resources at either
activity must be equal. In the case of corner outcomes, where the police exclusively target
one kind of activity, it must be that the marginal returns from monitoring that activity
(weakly) exceeds that from the other. Note that in computing these marginal returns to
monitoring, the measure of people ￿i engaged in each crime i must be treated as exogenous,
since policing strategy and criminal choices are simultaneous in the subgame. From (2), the
marginal return to increasing pi is ￿i(￿ici +￿si). Collecting together these observations and



























We will focus on the subgame perfect equilibrium of this partial commitment case. De-
note the relevant magnitudes by double asterisks (**). For arbitrary (s1;s2), let p1(s1;s2)
and p2(s1;s2) be the monitoring levels in the equilibrium of the subgame, as described in
(4), together with the resource constraint (1). It can easily be checked that each subgame
has a unique equilibrium, so that these are single valued functions. Finally, s￿￿
1 and s￿￿
2 are
obtained by substituting these functional expressions into the objective function in (3), and
maximizing it with respect to s1 and s2.
4 Preventive Motives
I ￿rst consider the extreme case where the penalties have no direct social utility (￿ = 0),
making redress or retribution irrelevant in the design of laws and their enforcement. However,
prevention is allowed to play a role (￿i > 0). I call this the prevention model.
In the prevention model with partial commitment, recalling the general objective function



































and (1), si ￿ S and pi ￿ 0 for i = 1;2.
It is straightforward that under full commitment, optimal punishments are maximal. For
￿xed p1 and p2, increased sanctions on any activity increases the expected cost of engaging in
that activity and will therefore cause fewer people to make that choice. When the authorities
cannot commit to an allocation of monitoring resources, however, the penalties will also a￿ect
the equilibrium choice of p1 and p2 in the monitoring subgame, and this must be taken into
account while choosing penalties in the ￿rst stage. Our ￿rst result is that in the preventive
model, optimal penalties are still maximal when this added complication is present.
Proposition 1 In the prevention model, there is always an equilibrium in which optimal
penalties are maximal under either full or partial commitment, i.e., s￿
i = s￿￿
i = S for i = 1;2.
Further, if p￿￿
i > 0 (p￿
i > 0) for i = 1;2, it must be that s￿￿
i = S (s￿
i = S).7
See Appendix B for proof. The basic intuition can be understood by examining (6),
the equilibrium condition in the subgame, in the case of an interior solution (the argument















That is, the ratio of the crime rates takes a value independent of the penalties. One impli-
cation of this is that the two crime rates must necessarily move together when some penalty
is changed, and it is only one small further step to see that they must both go down when
either s1 or s2 is increased. If crime rates went up, it must be the case that monitoring
resources ￿owed away from the activity which has been subjected to higher sanctions, in
7Strictly speaking, it is necessary that penalties be maximal only if both activities are allocated some
monitoring e￿ort. If p￿
2 = 0, for example, then nobody is deterred in activity 2 regardless of the penalty,
and hence it can be set at any value, including S.
12which case the other activity is now being monitored more closely. Since the penalty on that
activity has remained unchanged, it couldn’t be the case that it now produces more crime.
It may be tempting to think that introducing lack of commitment has no e￿ect on
the allocation of monitoring resources compared to the ￿rst best (the full commitment
case), which is why restructuring penalties is not necessary. This is untrue. Absence of
commitment generally gives rise to distortions, even when distributions and prevention rates
are symmetric. To see this, return to the full commitment problem, and assuming an interior
































This di￿ers from the monitoring equilibrium condition in the partial commitment case by
the extra term on the right hand side. This term captures the deterrence e￿ect, the e￿ect
of changing the allocation of monitoring resources ex ante, when people can learn about it
and respond accordingly, and precisely the e￿ect which is absent when these reallocations
are made concurrently with the decisions to engage in crimes. The deterrence e￿ect will
generally not be zero at the ￿rst best unless by an accidental con￿guration of the primitives,
and hence the allocation will depart from the ￿rst best when commitment is absent. In
fact under a mild assumption on the distribution of bene￿ts, satis￿ed by both uniform and
exponential distributions, an under policing of the more harmful activity arises.
Proposition 2 In the prevention model, if prevention rates are the same (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿)
across activities, and F1(:) = F2(:) = F(:), more monitoring resources are allocated to the
more harmful activity under full commitment, i.e., p￿
1 > p > p￿
2. Further, if F(:) has the non-
decreasing hazard rate property, then absence of commitment to monitoring leads to under
monitoring of the more harmful activity, i.e., p￿￿
1 ￿ p￿
1 with the inequality strict if p￿
1 < 2p.
For a formal proof, see Appendix B, but I will provide a sketch of the idea here. In
the partial commitment equilibrium, any possible preventive gains from reallocating police
resources have already been exploited, but deterrence gains (were these reallocations to be
13announced beforehand in a credible way) have not. Given symmetric response elasticities
and prevention rates, the more serious crime draws more resources in a partial commitment
equilibrium and has a lower crime rate, because otherwise, switching the monitoring levels
would reduce total harm. Under the hazard rate assumption, publicly shifting a small
additional amount of monitoring resource from the lesser to the greater crime would deter a
larger fraction of o￿enders in the more harmful activity than the fraction of new criminals
it creates in the less harmful one. Since the crime rates are already in inverse proportion to
their social harms, this would result in a decrease in net harm for society if the shift were
publicly observable.
It needs emphasizing that the monitoring distortion identi￿ed in Proposition 2 is not a
result of agency problems within the police department but the usual dynamic inconsistency
that arises in many games. Unlike prevention of ongoing attempts, deterrence is an ex ante
motive which ceases to operate once people have already decided whether or not to engage
in crimes.
5 Redress or Retributive Motives
Next, I will consider another special case where redress or retributive motives are present
(￿ > 0) but preventive motives are absent (￿i = 0). This could arise if the kind of crimes
under consideration are hard to prevent but possible to address after the fact (e.g., tax
evasion). One could also think of this as a limiting case of scenarios where redress or
retributive factors are large relative to preventive possibilities.
For convenience, the descripion of equilibrium under partial commitment is reproduced





[1 ￿ Fi (pisi)](ci ￿ ￿pisi) (9)
subject to









14and (1), si ￿ S and pi ￿ 0 for i = 1;2.
The following property is easily established:
Proposition 3 Consider the redress-retribution model (￿i = 0 for i = 1;2). Under full




i > 0, it must be that s￿
i = S for i = 1;2. Further, if F1(b) = F2(b) for all b, the more
harmful activity is monitored more intensively, i.e., p￿
1 > p > p￿
2.
While the formal proof is in Appendix B, the basic argument is very simple. With ￿xed p1
and p2, penalties have both a positive deterrent e￿ect as well as a positive redress-retribution
e￿ect|ceteris paribus, they reduce the number of people committing the relevant o￿ense,
and reduce the margin of net harm from each crime as well. Hence, the optimal ￿nes are
maximal if commitment were possible.
As for the comparison of the optimal monitoring choices, they depend not only on the
relative harm, but also the elasticities of response to expected penalties. If there is symmetry
in the second aspect, it is intuitive that the more harmful activity will draw greater scrutiny.
Under symmetry, it can be shown that if more resources are allocated to the less harmful
crime, reversing that allocation lowers net social harm.
As in the pure prevention case considered in the previous section, the partial commitment
equilibrium cannot replicate the full commitment equilibrium, implying a social loss arising
out of the inabiliy to commit to a policing strategy. To see this, assume F1(:) = F2(:)
and suppose s1 = s2 = S. From (10), it follows that in the second stage of the game,
p1 = p = p2. This allocation runs contrary to the characterization of the full commitment
allocation in Proposition 1, demonstrating that relaxing the commitment power has an
e￿ect on allocations and payo￿s, as in the prevention model. What is interesting here is the
implication for the optimal choice of penalties.
The next result shows that when the authorities cannot commit to an allocation of
monitoring resources across di￿erent crimes, it may be optimal to reduce the penalty on some
crime below what is feasible. If the disribution of bene￿ts is symmetric, then any reduced
penalty will apply to the less serious crime. Graduated penalties will arise if the di￿erence
in harms is large enough, or the redress motive relatively weaker than the deterrence motive.
This result on the restructuring of penalties in the presence of redress or retributive motives
15stands in sharp contrast to what we obtained for purely preventive motives in Proposition
1.
Proposition 4 Assume F1(b) = F2(b) = F(b) for all b. In any partial commitment equi-
librium of the redress-retribution model, the penalty on the more harmful activity is always
maximal, i.e., s￿￿
1 = S. The penalty on the less harmful activity is less than maximal
(s￿￿
2 < S) if
￿ <
c1F(pS)





Here, I will sketch the basic intuition behind the proof, leaving the more formal treatment
to Appendix B. First, a \switching argument" as before establishes that it can never be
optimal to impose a smaller penalty on the more harmful crime. If that were the case, then
in equilibrium, more people would commit the lesser crime than the serious one. If the
penalties were switched, the measures of o￿enders would also switch, due to the assumed
symmetry of the distributions. This preserves the total revenue collected from penalties,
but reduces the cumulative social damage by substituting a more harmful activity by a less
harmful one. It is also easy to show that the penalties on both crimes cannot be less than
maximal, because otherwise, there is a way of increasing these penalties such that both crime
rates are proportionately reduced. The only question that remains is whether there may be
circumstances where it is optimal to reduce the penalty on the lesser crime strictly below
maximum. Now, reducing the penalty on the lesser crime will typically8, as an equilibrium
response, shift policing resources to the more serious crime, deterring it to a greater degree
but allowing more of the less harmful activity. This is an acceptable tradeo￿ if the di￿erence
in harms is large enough.
8Though it sounds intuitive enough, for in￿nitesimal changes, this e￿ect is not general, but depends on
an elasticity condition. When the penalty on one activity is reduced, it is made less attractive as a revenue
source, and this direct e￿ect will tend to create a ￿ight of policing resources towards more remunerative
arrests. However, the disincentive e￿ect of reduced penalties also encourages more people to commit that
particular crime, which has the indirect e￿ect of attracting police attention. Whether there will be a
net reduction in monitoring depends on the relative strengths of these two e￿ects. It can be shown that
starting from arbitrary ￿nes (s1;s2) and associated equilibrium monitoring levels (p1;p2), slightly reducing
the penalty on crime i will increase the equilibrium allocation of police resources to the other crime if and
only if
xf(x)
1￿F(x) < 1 evaluated at x = pisi.
16A major di￿erence between the two variants of the model that have been considered is
that in the latter, penalties produce a direct social bene￿t which is absent in the former.
Nevertheless, the authorities will impose the most draconian punishment on a lesser crime
when they do not care about the punishment per se, but may want to soften it when they
￿nd punishment to be useful in itself. The key, of course, lies in how the sructure of penalties
a￿ects incentives in the subgame, and thereby overall deterrence.
Why are graduated penalties optimum in the redress-retribution case, but not in the
prevention case? To understand this, consider the monitoring equilibrium in the redress-














In this case, unlike (7), the ratio of crime rates is not a constant, but equal to the ratio of the
penalties. When s2 is lowered, it allows a potential substitution|lowering the crime rate in
the more harmful activity (the numerator on the left hand side) at the cost of increasing the
crime rate in the less harmful one (the denominator). The prevention model presented no
such trade-o￿, since the two crime rates always moved together. Under the right conditions,
the slope of this trade-o￿ is high enough to make a reduction in penalties on the lesser crime
worthwhile.
(11) is derived by comparing the total social cost that arises when the lesser crime is
legalized, against what would be incurred if penalties were uniformly maximal. It is only
su￿cient, not necessary, for the optimal penalty on the lesser crime to be less than maximal.
An alternative su￿cient condition can be derived by examining the derivative of social cost
with respect to s2 when both penalties are set at S, and ask under what conditions it
is positive. Typically, this will depend on the elasticities of crime rates with respect to
expected cost, i.e., the poperties of the density function f(:), in addition to the value of ￿.
Also, whenever (11) is satis￿ed, it is not necessarily true that completely legalizing activity 2
is optimal. There may be penalties that are positive but less than maximal which minimize
net social cost.
The need for lowering punishment critically depends on the general equilibrium e￿ects.
Optimal penalties are always maximal in a single act model of crime with an exogenous cost
17of monitoring, even if similar assumptions are introduced (i.e., there are revenue motives in
addition to deterrence motives, and the authorities cannot commit to a monitoring level).
This is shown in Appendix A, but the basic intuition is not hard to see. In a single act
model, commitment problems always lead to under deterrence, and fairly standard argu-
ments establish that raising penalties will lower the crime rate. Only in a multi act model
does the situation arise that some activity may be over deterred, and lowering the penalty
on that activity may move the allocation in the right direction.
6 An Example and Further Observaions
In this section, I consider a speci￿c example and explicitly derive solutions for the various
cases. The solutions illustrate some further interesting properties that may arise in models
of this class.
Suppose the distribution of bene￿ts for activity 1 is uniform on [0;a], and that for activity
2 uniform on [0;1], where a ￿ 1. Further, let p = 0:5 and S = 1.
First, consider the redress-retribution model (￿i = 0) with ￿ = 1. If the authorities can
commit to a monitoring strategy, taking punishments to be maximal (Proposition 3) and





(a ￿ p1)(c1 ￿ p1) + p1(c2 ￿ 1 + p1) (13)





> 0. There is
either a unique interior solution, or the solution lies in one of the two corners. The solution is
p￿
1 = 0 when the following Kuhn-Tucker condition holds: the ￿rst derivative is non-negative




When a is very high, the serious crime is hard to deter, since the elasticity of response
to higher expected penalties is low. In such situations, it is better to concentrate law
enforcement resources in those areas where behavior is more responsive, even though the
harm is not as high. Note that whenever p￿
1 = 0, the same outcome can be reproduced even
18in the absence of commitment by setting s1 = 0, and that choosing s1 = S will lead to an
interior (hence sub-optimal) allocation9. The preceding discussion can be summarized as
Observation 1: If the crime rate in the more harmful act is su￿ciently inelastic with
respect to expected penalties and the state cannot commit to a monitoring strategy, optimal
punishments may be inversely related to social harm.
It seems unlikely this situation will arise often in reality, at least to any pronounced
degree. In any case, the more general point remains|when punishment is valuable in itself,
it may not be optimal to punish every type of harmful action maximally.
For the rest of this section, I will take a = 1, i.e., the distribution of bene￿ts are identical.
In this case, p￿
1 = 0 is ruled out. The solution lies at the other corner (p￿
1 = 1) if the following
Kuhn-Tucker condition is satis￿ed: the derivative of the objective function in (13) is non-
positive at p1 = 1. Using a = 1, this yields
c1 ￿ c2 ￿ 2 (14)
(14) is the condition under which the less harmful activity will not be monitored at all and
hence e￿ectively legalized under commitment.
Turning to the case without commitment, at any interior allocation, the ratio of crime
rates must equal the inverse ratio of penalties by (10). Since s￿￿




= s2 ) p1 =
1
1 + s2
Note that an interior allocation is indeed achieved for any s2 > 0. Utilizing the fact that
s￿￿
1 = S = 1, social cost can be written as
W = (1 ￿ p1)(c1 ￿ p1) + (1 ￿ p2)(c2 ￿ p2s2)
Using the resource constraint p1 + p2 = 1 and substituting the expression for p1 obtained
above into the objective function and simplifying, we get the following expression for social
9If p1 = 0, the measure of people committing crime 1 will be one, while the measure of people committing
crime 2 is less than one. Since penalties are both maximal, the marginal revenue from allocating police
resources to the ￿rst activity exceeds that in the second, so this situation cannot be an equilibrium.
19cost as a function of the penalty chosen for activity 2:
W(s2) =
(c1 ￿ 1)s2 + c2
1 + s2
The ￿rst derivative can be computed as
W
0(s2) =
c1 ￿ c2 ￿ 1
(1 + s2)2
which is clearly decreasing in s2, i.e., the function is strictly concave. Hence, the problem of
minimizing W by choosing s2 always yields a corner solution, with either s￿￿
2 = 0 or s￿￿
2 = 1.
The former is obtained whenever the derivative is non-negative at s2 = 0, i.e.,
c1 ￿ c2 ￿ 1 (15)
(15) is the condition under which the less harmful activity will be legalized in the absence
of commitment. Comparing (14) and (15), one can clearly see that legalization is optimal in
the absence of commitment for a strictly larger set of parameter values than those for which
it is optimal under commitment. Recall from previous discussion that whenever p￿
2 = 0,
the commitment outcome can be achieved by choosing s2 = 0. This leads to the following
observation
Observation 2: If it is optimal to legalize an activity when the state can commit to any
allocation of monitoring resources, it is also optimal to do so in the absence of commitment.
However, the converse is not true, i.e., there may be situations where an activity that would
have attracted a positive amount of penalties and monitoring under commitment is optimally
legalized in the absence of commitment.
I next turn to the total harm and collection of penalties that arise under the two di￿erent
assumptions regarding secondary motives. The total harm c caused by the activities is given
by
c = (1 ￿ p
￿￿
1 )c1 + p
￿￿
1 c2 (16)
while the sum of revenues R collected from the penalties is












1 (1 ￿ p
￿￿
1 )(1 + s
￿￿
2 ) (17)
20In the redress-retribution model, there are two di￿erent cases to consider: interior and corner
allocations. First, suppose (15) is satis￿ed, so that s￿￿
2 = 0 and p￿￿
1 = 1. In this case, c = c2
and R = 0. If (15) does not hold, then the optimum penalty lies at the other corner: s￿￿
2 = 1.
Since the crime rates will be in the ratio of penalties, we get p￿￿
1 = 1
2. Using this in (16) and
(17), we get c = 1
2(c1 + c2) and R = 1





c2 if c1 ￿ c2 ￿ 1
1





0 if c1 ￿ c2 ￿ 1
1
2 if c1 ￿ c2 < 1
where the subscript \retr" represents the values obtained in the redress-retribution model.
Next, consider the prevention model (￿ = 0), with the common prevention rate being
positive but negligibly small (￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ ￿ = 0). In the absence of commitment, punishments
are maximal (Proposition 1) and the allocation of monitoring resources will be such that
the ratio of crime rates is equal to the inverse ratio of the harms (it is easy to see that an













Using this in (16) and (17) above, and using the subscript \prev" to distinguisg magnitudes
obtained in the prevention case, we obtain expressions for the total harm and total revenue







Suppose c1￿c2 ￿ 1. In this case, comparison is straightforward, and we obtain: cretr < cprev
and Rretr < Rprev. Crime is higher when there is no distraction posed by revenues, and
revenues are lower when collecting them is indeed one objective! To state it formally:
Observation 3: The total harm from crime may be higher when the state’s only objective
is to deter and prevent crime, and revenues may be lower when the state has the secondary
objective of raising revenues in addition to deterring crime.
21Comparing welfare across the two polar cases is problematic, since they arise from di￿er-
ent sets of preferences. Nevertheless, one can ask if a \no-envy" condition holds: i.e., will a
state motivated only by deterrence and prevention prefer the outcome that arises when pun-
ishment is valued? Coversely, will a state that values punishment wish that it could convince
people otherwise? The answer to this question depends on parameters and distributions,
but the example solved here illustrates that no-envy may fail in both directions.
Under the assumption that the prevention rate ￿ is negligible, the authorities in the
prevention model care only about the cumulative harm, c. Observe that when c1 ￿ c2 ￿ 1,
cretr < cprev. In this case, a state focused only on reducing crime would have been more
e￿ective vis-a-vis that objective if it had some retribution or revenue motive. On the other
hand, the authorities in the redress-retribution case envy the outcome in the prevention
model if the additional revenue outweighs the increased crime in the other outcome, i.e., if
Rprev ￿Rretr > cprev ￿cretr. Again, considering the case where c1 ￿c2 ￿ 1, this is satis￿ed if
2c1c2




or c1 ￿ c2 <
2c1
c1 + c2
Since the right hand side above is greater than 1, we have a non-empty region of the para-
meter space, described by
1 < c1 ￿ c2 <
2c1
c1 + c2
where no-envy fails both ways. To summarize:
Observation 4: It is possible that a state whose only objective is to reduce the harm from
crime would be better o￿ delegating authority to someone who also values retribution or
revenues. Also, a state that values retribution or revenues in addition to reducing crime
may be better o￿ delegating authority to someone whose only objective is to reduce crime.
There are parameters and distributions for which these are simultaneously true.
The last observation points to several interesting possibilities that will not be pursued in
detail here. First, and most directly, it shows the possible bene￿ts of delegation at various
levels|administrative, political or otherwise. For example, an electorate concerned solely
22about improving law and order as a practical matter may want to vote for political parties
with a strongly retributive view of justice. Second, the presence of police corruption may
actually solve some of the problems raised by the absence of commitment. Presumably,
bribes will be positively related to the o￿cial penalties chosen by the legislature, which
gives it some leverage over the ultimate allocation of monitoring resources. Last, if there is
incomplete information regarding the actual objectives of the lawmakers and law enforcers,
it opens up interesting possibilities of signaling through the penalty structure chosen. As
we have seen, there may be scenarios where each type wants to mimic the other.
7 Conclusion
This paper argues that graduated penalties observed in most legal systems may be an at-
tempt to direct law enforcement e￿orts towards crimes that are socially more harmful,
thereby achieving better deterrence overall. The critical assumptions are: the state cannot
commit to a monitoring strategy, and has mixed motives (objectives other than deterrence).
However, graduated penalties arise only in the presence of secondary motives that value pun-
ishment in itself, such as retribution or ￿nes collected from violators. Other motives that
are unrelated to the size of punishment, such as prevention of criminal attempts, will also
lead to distortions, but those cannot be corrected by restructuring penalties. The overall
harshness of a criminal justice system and the retributive instincts of its designers may be
related in counter intuitive ways, and law enforcement may be improved through strategic
delegation. Other than reaching these speci￿c conclusions, the paper also tries to extend
the framework of analysis in the study of optimal deterrence, by incorporating plausible sec-
ondary objectives, dropping strong assumptions regarding policy commitment and exploring
general equilibrium e￿ects.
238 Appendix A: The One Act Model
In this section, I show that optimal penalties are always maximal in a one act model of
crime, even in the presence of mixed motives and commitment problems. This demonstrates
that the general equilibrium e￿ects which arise when there are competing demands on police
resources are crucial to the result that penalties may need to be moderated or clearly harmful
acts legalized.
Consider a single harmful act whose bene￿ts are distributed according to F(b), social
harm of each act being c, the penalty s ￿ S and the intensity of monitoring p, where p
can be generated subject to an increasing, convex cost function ￿(p). To guarantee interior
solutions, assume that ￿(:) satis￿es the Inada conditions: ￿0(0) = 0 and ￿0(1) = 1, and
further, F(S) < 1 (not everyone can be deterred). Each unit of penalty generates a bene￿t
of ￿ to the authorities who impose sanctions and monitor the population for infractions.
Since prevention failed to produce less than maximal penalties even in the multi-act model,
we ignore it here.
I will only analyze the case of partial commitment, since full commitment will yield
maximal penalties for the usual reasons. Fix some penalty s. In the subgame, the choice of
monitoring is optimal given the crime rate, which yields the ￿rst order condition
￿s[1 ￿ F(ps)] = ￿
0(p) (18)
This yields the monitoring choice p(s) as a function of the penalty chosen in the ￿rst stage.
The left hand side is the marginal revenue from increasing the monitoring rate, while the
right hand side is the marginal cost. At the legislative stage, the problem is
min
s [1 ￿ F(ps)](c ￿ ￿ps) + ￿(p) (19)
subject to rational anticipation of the outcome in the monitoring stage, i.e., p = p(s).
(18) has the immediate implication that the crime rate 1 ￿ F(ps) must be decreasing in
the choice of s. Suppose not, i.e., suppose 1 ￿ F(ps) goes up when s is increased. Then,
from (18), it follows that p must be higher, since the marginal returns from monitoring (the
left hand side) is higher. However, this means expected sanctions ps must be higher too,
which contradicts the assumption that the crime rate 1 ￿ F(ps) has gone up.
24Now consider two penalties s0 and s00, with s00 > s0. Let p0 and p00 denote the corresponding
monioring choices that arise in the subgame, and let ￿0 = 1 ￿ F(p0s0) and ￿00 = 1 ￿ F(p00s00)



































This establishes that the objective function in (19) is strictly decreasing in s. Hence, the
optimal penalty is the maximal penalty.
259 Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: In the full commitment case, the proof is trivial, since the
objective function is increasing in si, and strictly so if p1;p2 > 0.
Turning to the partial commitment case, the proof is divided into three parts.
Case 1: p￿￿
i > 0 for i = 1;2. In this case, the solution to the problem coincides with the
solution to the more restrictive problem where (s1;s2) must be such that (6) holds with


































where the last line follows from the resource constraint (1). Minimizing this objective func-






Continuity of Fi(:) implies continuity of pi(s1;s2), which in turn implies that if pi(s1;s2) >
0 at some (s0
1;s0
2), then the inequality continues to hold in a small enough neighborhood of
(s0
1;s0
2). Note that (6) together with (1) implies that when some penalty si is changed










, must both move in the same direction, since their ratio is a constant. I
claim that these magnitudes are strictly decreasing functions of s1 and s2. Consider a pair of
penalties (s0
1;s0
2) and another pair (s00
1;s00





2, and let (p0
1;p0
2) ￿ 0 and (p00
1;p00
2) ￿ 0 be the pair of monitoring choices resectively

















for i = 1;2:
Since s00
i ￿ s0
i, the above inequality implies p00
i ￿ p0









1. However, this violates the resource






hence also the objective function) is strictly decreasing in the penalties s1 and s2. Therefore,
if p￿￿
1 ;p￿￿
2 > 0, optimal penalties must be maximal, i.e., s￿￿
i = S for i = 1;2.
Case 2: p￿￿


















(1 ￿ 2p￿1)c1 + c2
If the inequality above is weak, then an argument exactly as above establishes that the
objective function must be strictly decreasing in the penalties in any small neighborhood,
and hence they must be maximal. Suppose the inequality is strict. Since the objective
function is decreasing strictly in s1 and weakly in s2, s￿￿
1 must be maximal and setting s￿￿
2
to be maximal yields the same outcome as any other value.
Case 3: p￿￿
1 = 0. The argument in this case exactly mirrors that in case 2, and is hence
ommitted.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let ￿1 = ￿2 = ￿ and F1(:) = F2(:) = F(:). In what follows, the
fact that optimal penalties are maximal both with and without commitment (Proposition
1) will be used throughout. We ￿rst show that p￿
1 > p > p￿
2. Suppose not, i.e., let p￿
1 ￿ p.
Then, if the monitoring levels are switched, i.e., choosing p1 = p￿
2 and p2 = p￿
1 instead, the
change in net social cost is given by

























1 < p < p￿
2, ￿W < 0, because the term inside square brackets is negative. This
contradicts the fact that (p￿
1;p￿
2) minimizes W, hence p￿
1 ￿ p. It remains to show that the
inequality must be strict.
Suppose p￿
1 = p. Then, using the symmetry assumptions in the ￿rst order condition (8)



















27However, the expression on the left hand side is strictly positive, generating a contradiction.
Hence, (8) is not satis￿ed at p￿
1 = p and it can be ruled out as the solution.




















1 is interior but contrary to claim, p￿￿
1 ￿ p￿




























1 > 0. Hence, (6) implies  (p￿￿
1 ) ￿ 0. Noting that  (:) is a decreasing
function, we have  (p￿







































since (1 ￿ p
￿
1￿) < (1 ￿ p
￿
2￿)




















































But this is impossible if the hazard rate is non-decreasing, since it was already established
that p￿
1 > p￿




1 is not interior, i.e., p￿
1 = 2p, it is trivially true that p￿￿
1 ￿ p￿
1.
Proof of Proposition 3: If p￿
i > 0, it is easily veri￿ed that under Assumption I, the
objective function is strictly decreasing in si, and therefore, each penalty is optimally chosen
to be at its maximal level. Basically, since p1 and p2 can be chosen independent of the ￿nes,
increasing si reduces both the number of people committing the crime, 1 ￿ Fi(pisi), as well
as the net social loss from each criminal action, ci ￿￿pisi. If p￿
i = 0, varying si has no e￿ect
on social cost W, and hence any choice (including the maximal penalty S) is optimum.
For the second part, let F1(:) = F2(:) = F(:). Setting the ￿nes at the maximal level, the


















1 = p = p￿
2 can then be ruled out because in that case, the left hand side of
(20) takes the value 0, while the right hand side is 1
￿(c1 ￿ c2)f(pS) > 0. Suppose, then,
p￿
1 < p < p￿
2. We can show that in this case, the value of the objective function can be lowered
further by switching around these probabilities, i.e., by choosing p1 = p￿
2 and p2 = p￿
1 instead.
The change in social cost from doing so is given by























which contradicts the fact that p￿
1 and p￿
2 constitute an optimum.
Proof of Proposition 4: We ￿rst show that s￿￿
1 ￿ s￿￿
2 . Suppose not, i.e., s￿￿
1 < s￿￿
2 . From










Now consider the penalties being switched, i.e., s1 = s￿￿
2 and s2 = s￿￿
1 . From (10), we
conclude that the equilibrium probabilities will be switched too, i.e., p1 = p￿￿
2 and p2 = p￿￿
1 .
The change in social cost due to this switch is given by










































2 )] < 0
which contradicts the fact that s￿￿
1 ;s￿￿





1 < S. Consider a new pair of penalties, s0
1 = s￿￿







where ￿ is chosen small enough such that s0
1 ￿ S and s0
2 ￿ S. Let (p0
1;p0
2) be the equilibrium



























































2 , because it violates the resource




i for i = 1;2. Now, inspection of
the objective function in (9) makes it clear that it is decreasing in the values of the expected





2), which contradicts optimality. Hence, it cannot be that s￿￿
1 < S, as supposed.
Thus far, we have established that s￿￿
1 = S ￿ s￿￿
2 . It remains to show the last part of the
proposition, that s￿￿
2 is strictly lower than the maximal penalty S when ￿ is low enough.
For this to be true, it is su￿cient that legalizing activity 2 (s2 = 0) creates lower social
cost than having maximal penalties (s1 = s2 = S). When s2 = 0, the police will devote all
resources to monitoring activity 1, and hence W is given by
[1 ￿ F(2pS)](c1 ￿ 2￿pS) + ￿c1 (21)
If s1 = s2 = S, then upon using (10), we get p1 = p2 = p in the subgame. Social cost is
given by
[1 ￿ F(pS)][(1 + ￿)c1 ￿ 2￿pS] (22)
30Subtracting (22) from (21), we get
[F(pS) ￿ F(2pS)][c1 ￿ 2￿pS] + ￿c1F(pS)]
The ￿rst term is negative, while the second is positive, so clearly the net di￿erence is
negative if ￿ is small enough, in which case the optimal penalty on activity 2 must be less
than maximal. The exact condition, (11), is obtained by requiring the above expression to
be negative.
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